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ABSTRACT 
 
 The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) system is a classical physical secure 
key exchange scheme based on the Kirchhoff’s circuit loop law and the fluctuation-
dissipation theorem of statistical physics. This dissertation contains two main studies 
related to this scheme: bit error analysis and removal, and applications in vehicular 
communication systems. 
The thesis starts with a presentation of some of the challenges faced by modern 
communications. It also includes a description of the working principle of the KLJN 
system and the motivation upon which this dissertation is built. Then, a study of the 
errors in this scheme is carried out. In the first part, the types of errors due to statistical 
inaccuracies in the voltage-based and current-based measurement modes are classified 
and analyzed. In both measurement modes and for all types of errors, at fixed bandwidth, 
the error probabilities decay exponentially versus the duration of the bit sharing period. 
In the second part, an error removal method is proposed to improve the fidelity of the 
system. This method is based on the combination of the voltage-based and current-based 
schemes and it drastically reduces the error probabilities. 
The second topic of study in the thesis explores a potential practical application 
for the KLJN key exchange scheme. First, we present a vehicular communication 
network architecture with unconditionally secure KLJN keys. Secondly, a new solution 
for secure KLJN key donation to vehicles is proposed and an upper limit for the lifetime 
of this key is given. 
 iii 
 
A summary of the work is given in the last section and the main results of the 
research are discussed. These contributions include: closed-form expressions for the 
error probabilities in the KLJN system, error removal methods without the need of 
implementing any error correcting technique, and a new potential vehicular application 
for the KLJN scheme. Some of the future research initiatives related to these topics are 
discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
*
 
 
1.1 Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange 
 
In today’s era, security has become one of the most important issues in 
communication networks. Whether it is a large, small, private, or a government 
organization, it is very important to address security, especially when the data being 
sent, received, or stored contains confidential, sensitive information, such as personal 
information. Security aspects in communication networks include authentication, 
accountability and non-repudiation, data confidentiality, and integrity [1]. Authentication 
ensures that the receiver is able to validate the sender of the message by reading only 
information sent from legitimate senders. Accountability and non- repudiation guarantee 
that nodes cannot deny having sent/received a message. Data confidentiality ensures that 
the communication content remains private and protected the entire time. Integrity 
                                                 
*
Part of this section is a modified reprinted version of: Y. Saez and L. B. Kish, Errors and their mitigation 
at the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure key exchange, PLoS ONE 8 (2013) e81103 (7 pages), © 2013 
Saez and Kish. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: Journal of. 
Computational Electronics, Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the 
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange, 13, 2014, 271–277, Y. Saez, L. B. Kish, R. Mingesz, 
Z. Gingl, and C. G. Granqvist, © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from: Y. Saez, X. Cao, L. B. Kish, and G. Pesti, 
Securing Vehicle Communication Systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol, Fluctuation and Noise 
Letters 13 (2014) 1450020 (14 pages), © World Scientific Publishing Company 2014. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from: X. Cao, Y. Saez, G. Pesti, and L. B. Kish, On 
KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks, Fluctuation and Noise Letters. 
14 (2015) 1550008 (11 pages), © World Scientific Publishing Company 2015. 
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ensures that unauthorized observers cannot read, modify, delete, insert, and/or reorder 
messages.  
Attacks targeting the security of communication networks fall into two 
categories: passive (listening) attacks and active (invasive) attacks [1]. Passive 
(listening) attacks involve those attacks in which a malicious adversary attempts to learn 
or to make use of the information being transmitted without modifying the information 
or affecting the communication system resources. An example of passive attack includes 
the situation where the malicious adversary continuously monitors (listens) the 
communication in order to recognize patterns that could be used to extract the 
information. In active (invasive) attacks, the malicious adversary attempts to gain access 
to the information by intentionally modifying the system, thus affecting its operation. An 
example of an active attack is the man in the middle (MITM) attack [1], where the 
attacker inserts an intermediate node in the communication path and pretends to be one 
of the two communicating parties in order to extract, insert, and/or modify the 
information being transmitted. This dissertation focuses primarily on confidentiality 
aspects of communication networks, and passive attacks are of primary concern in this 
context.  
 In symmetric key-based secure communication, the two communicating parties 
(often referred to as Alice and Bob) generate and share a secure key, which is typically 
represented by a random bit sequence. This key is used to encrypt and decrypt all the 
information transmitted between Alice and Bob. During this key exchange, a potential 
eavesdropper (often referred to as Eve) is continuously monitoring the communication. 
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Therefore, the security in the communication depends on the capability of Alice and Bob 
to secretly share this key while Eve is continuously monitoring/listening to the exchange. 
It is important to note that the security of the communication cannot be better than the 
security of the key exchange scheme it uses. 
In today’s internet-based secure communications, typically a software-based key 
generation and distribution method is utilized. However, Eve’s information about the 
key is limited only by her computation power [1]. In other words, these methods provide 
only (computationally) conditional security level, which is not future-proof [2–5]. That 
is, Eve could record the communication in the present and in the future, when she has 
access to sufficient computation power, or to an efficient algorithm (to be developed), 
she could crack the key and all the communicated information becomes accessible. 
Therefore, scientists and engineers have been exploring relevant laws of physics 
to find new secure key exchange schemes. When the communicated signal has full 
information about the key but Eve cannot access it even if she has unlimited 
computation power, that is called unconditional security, a term that is often 
interchanged with information theoretic security (i.e., zero information about the key for 
Eve) [1]. In other words, the security measures are determined by information theory or, 
in physical systems, by measurement (information) theory. Security can theoretically be 
perfect if Eve can extract no information, or imperfect (the practical situation), if Eve 
can extract only a small amount of information. Unconditional security assumes that the 
practical imperfect security level can arbitrarily approach the perfect security situation 
provided enough resources are available, such as enough time for privacy amplification 
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(PA, a software-based technique used to improve the security of a partially exposed key) 
[6]. 
It is important to emphasize that the goal to generate/distribute a perfectly secure 
key is similar to the aim of reaching infinity. Perfectly secure key distribution of a key of 
finite length can never be reached with a real physical system within a finite duration of 
time. However, it is one of the goals of physical informatics to find out unconditionally 
secure schemes that can arbitrarily approach (though never reach) perfect security [2, 3]. 
The earliest and most famous scheme based on the laws of physics that is 
claiming unconditional security is quantum key distribution (QKD) [7]. The information 
theoretic security of this scheme is usually based on the assumption that Eve's actions 
will disturb the system (in accordance with the theory of quantum measurements and the 
no-cloning theorem [7]) and cause errors, uncovering the eavesdropping. Note, there are 
some promising non-QKD initiatives that involve other types of quantum schemes [8, 9]. 
At the fundamental side, there are ongoing debates between experts about the 
reachable levels of security in QKD [10–14]. At the practical side, there are some issues 
associated with this scheme, such as range, price, and robustness. Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that recently all the commercial QKD devices and several laboratory 
systems have been cracked by quantum hacking [15–29]. While most of these practical 
weaknesses seem to be design flaws, not fundamental security problems; they still mean 
that before fixing theses weaknesses, QKD had only conditional security: the conditions 
were that Eve was not knowledgeable enough or she did not have the proper hardware to 
utilize the design flaws for an attack. The volume of work in [15–29] shows that there 
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were enough knowledgeable “Eves” out there with sufficient resources to be able to 
crack QKD devices. 
Until 2005, QKD was the only accepted scheme that was able to offer a key 
exchange with information theoretic security in the ideal (mathematical) limit. In that 
year, the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution was introduced 
[30], where the term "totally secure" was used instead of the technically precise 
"unconditionally secure" expression. Later in 2006, the KLJN system was built and 
demonstrated in extensive experiments [31]. KLJN is a key exchange scheme with 
information theoretic security [4] and it is based on Kirchhoff’s circuit loop law and the 
fluctuation-dissipation theorem of statistical physics. Its security against passive attacks 
is ultimately based on the second law of thermodynamics [4, 30–33], which means that it 
is as hard to crack the KLJN key exchange as to build a perpetual motion machine (of 
the second kind). 
Table 1 compares the main features of the QKD and the KLJN key exchange 
schemes [34]. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Main features of the QKD and the KLJN secure key exchange schemes 
 
QKD KLJN 
Information carrier Photons Electrons 
Medium (channel) Optical fiber or air Wire 
Security level (ideal 
system) 
Information theoretic 
(unconditional) 
Information theoretic 
(unconditional) 
Security foundation “Non-cloning” theorem of 
quantum physics 
Second law of 
thermodynamics 
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Table 1 Continued 
 QKD KLJN 
Protection against 
“man in the middle 
attacks”? 
No (for single raw 
bits) 
Yes (even for single raw bits) 
Speed Low/High (debated)  Low 
Range Few hundred miles 
(exponential speed-
cutoff) 
Unlimited (power-law speed-cutoff) 
Size 
Bulky (desktop 
instrument size) 
Chip-level-integration possible 
Cost Expensive 
($100,000 a pair) 
Reasonable ($20,000) 
 
 
 
 This dissertation addresses some special topics about the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-
noise (KLJN) key exchange scheme. In section 1.2, a brief background on thermal noise 
in resistors is presented. Then, the working principle of the ideal KLJN secure key 
exchange scheme is explained in detail, along with its main characteristics and features. 
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 introduce the motivations for our work. Section 2 classifies and 
analyzes the bit errors in the KLJN system. Then, error removal methods are shown to 
reduce the bit error probabilities. In section 3, a vehicular communication network with 
KLJN-based unconditionally secure key exchange is presented. The KLJN key lifetime 
is analyzed and the procedures for key generation and donation to vehicles are described. 
Section 4 presents a summary of the results; along with important research initiatives to 
be considered in the future. 
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1.2 The Ideal Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange Scheme 
 
1.2.1 Thermal noise in resistors 
 
Johnson-Nyquist noise (thermal noise) is the electronic noise caused by the 
thermal motion of electrons within an electrical conductor. Mr. John B. Johnson, of Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, was the ﬁrst to conduct experimental analysis and 
measurements of this phenomenon in 1926, followed by Dr. Harry Nyquist who was 
then able to develop the theory behind this phenomenon [35, 36]. Below, based on [37], 
we present a brief summary of some important concepts related to thermal noise. 
The thermal noise equivalent circuits for the resistance 𝑅 are shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Thermal noise equivalent circuits for resistance R  (a) Thevenin equivalent circuit and (b) 
Norton equivalent circuit 
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In thermal equilibrium at temperature T , the root-mean-square (RMS) thermal 
voltage thu  on an open-circuit resistance R  is: 
 
4th noiseu kTRB ,                                                                                                            (1) 
 
where k  is the Boltzmann’s constant ( 231.38 10 J/K), T  is the absolute temperature of 
the resistance in kelvins (K), R  is the resistance, and noiseB  is the bandwidth of the noise 
of the measurement system in hertz (Hz). According to Norton’s theorem, the RMS 
thermal noise current thi  of the resistance R  is given by: 
 
4 noise
th
kTB
i
R
 .                                                                                                               (2) 
 
The power spectral density (PSD) of a thermal narrowband (1 Hz unit of 
bandwidth) noise voltage thu  on an open-circuit resistance R  is given by: 
 
 
2
, 4
th
u th
noise
u
S f kTR
B
  .                                                                                                  (3) 
 
Due to Ohm’s law, the PSD of the noise current thi  is: 
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 ,
4
i th
kT
S f
R
 .                                                                                                                (4) 
 
 From Eqs. (3) and (4), and by applying Kirchhoff’s loop law, the PSD of the 
resultant noise voltage and current on two parallel resistors 1R  and 2R  are: 
 
 ||
1 2
, , ||
1 2
4 4u th R
R R
S f kTR kT
R R
 

                                                                                    (5) 
 
and 
 
 , ,
1 2
4 4
loopi th R
loop
kT kT
S f
R R R
 

,                                                                                          (6) 
 
respectively, where 
1 2
||
1 2
R R
R
R R


 and 1 2loopR R R  . 
 
1.2.2 The core KLJN key distribution system 
 
 Figure 2 shows the fundamental Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key 
distribution system [2, 4, 30, 31, 38, 39] without defense elements against both active 
(invasive) attacks and attacks targeting vulnerabilities represented by non-ideal building 
elements. In this ideal system, all non-idealities such as wire resistance, wire 
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capacitance, wire inductance, transient effects, etc., are neglected. Therefore, the time-
dependent voltage and current are spatially homogenous along the wire (“lumped 
parameter” model). Under practical conditions, this system utilizes enhanced Johnson 
noise with high noise temperature, obtained from Gaussian noises generated 
electronically so that quasi-static and thermodynamic characteristics are emulated as 
accurately as possible, in order to approach perfect security [40]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Outline of the core KLJN secure key exchange scheme without defense circuitry (current/voltage 
monitoring/comparison) against invasive attacks or attacks utilizing non-ideal components and conditions. 
effT  is the effective noise temperature, AR , ( )Au t , BR , and ( )Bu t  are the resistor values and noise 
voltages at Alice and Bob, respectively. ( )cu t  and i ( )c t  are channel noise voltage and current, 
respectively 
 
 
 
The core KLJN channel is represented by a wire line. The two communicating 
parties, “Alice” and “Bob”, have an identical closed set of finite non-zero value resistors 
{ 0 1,R R }, with 0 1R R . Typically, one resistor is about 10 times bigger than the other. 
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The resistor 0R  indicates the low (0) bit value and the resistor 1R  indicates the high (1) 
bit value, respectively [30]. At the beginning of each clock period or bit sharing period 
(BSP), Alice and Bob, who are synchronized in time, randomly choose one resistor from 
the set { 0 1,R R } and connect it to the wire line. Thus, AR , BR { 0 1,R R }, as seen in Fig. 
2.The Gaussian voltage noise generators represent either the Johnson noises of the 
resistors or external noise generators delivering band-limited white noise with publicly 
known bandwidth KLJNB  and effective noise temperature effT  [2, 30, 31]. According to 
the fluctuation-dissipation theorem, the enhanced Johnson noise voltages of Alice’s and 
Bob’s resistors—denoted ( )Au t  and ( )Bu t  respectively, where  0, 1,( ), ( )A A Au u t u t  and 
 0, 1,( ), ( )B B Bu u t u t —generate a channel noise voltage ( )cu t  between the wire line and 
ground as well as a channel noise current ( )ci t  in the wire. 
Within the BSP, Alice and Bob (and Eve) measure the mean-square channel 
noise voltage and/or current amplitudes, i.e., 2 ( )cu t  and/or 2 ( )ci t . By applying 
Johnson’s noise formula and Kirchhoff’s voltage loop law, it follows Eqs. (5) and (6) 
that the theoretical values of the mean-square noise voltage and current for a given 
channel noise bandwidth KLJNB  and temperature effT  are [2, 30]: 
 
2
, ||( ) ( ) 4c u c KLJN eff KLJNu t S f B kT R B                                     (7) 
 
and 
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2
,
1
( ) ( ) 4c i c KLJN eff KLJN
loop
i t S f B kT B
R
  ,                        (8) 
 
respectively. Here, 2 ( )cu t  and 2 ( )ci t  represent ideal infinite-time averages of the 
square of the channel noise voltage and current, respectively; , ( )u cS f  is the power 
spectral density of the channel noise voltage, , ( )i cS f  is the power spectral density of the 
channel noise current, k  is Boltzmann’s constant, ||
A B
A B
R R
R
R R


, and loop A BR R R  . 
The resistance values ||R  and/or loopR  can be publicly known by comparing the 
result of the measurements of the mean-square channel noise voltage and/or current 
amplitudes with the corresponding theoretical values obtained from Eqs. (7) and (8). 
Alice and Bob know their own chosen resistors, and hence the total resistances ||R  and/or 
loopR  allow them to deduce the resistance value and actual bit status at the other end of 
the wire. 
 The cases when Alice and Bob choose the same resistance values—i.e., the 00 
and 11 situations—represent a non-secure bit exchange. In these situations, Eve will be 
able to find the resistor values, their location (i.e., which end of the line has connected 
1R  and which end has connected 0R ), and the status of the bits, because the total 
resistance will be either the lowest or the highest value of the three possible magnitudes 
of the total resistance. The situations when Alice and Bob randomly choose different 
resistance values—i.e., the 01 and 10 situations—signify a secure bit exchange event 
because these resistances cannot be distinguished by the measured mean-square values. 
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Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the inverse of his/her bit, which implies 
that a secure key exchange takes place. In conclusion, on average, 50% of the bits can be 
kept because they are secure. The other 50% of the bits representing the non-secure 
situations are discarded by the protocol. 
 It is important to point out that since the securely exchanged bits have opposite 
values at Alice and Bob’s sides, they must publicly and a priori agree on which one of 
them will invert the exchanged bit in order to have identical keys at the two ends [40]. 
 
1.2.3 Security proof against passive attacks 
 
  The ideal KLJN system provides unconditional security against passive 
(listening) attacks. First, during the secure bit exchange situations—i.e., the situations 
when Alice and Bob have connected different resistors to the wire—the PSD of the 
channel noise voltage is: 
 
0 1
,
0 1
( ) 4u c eff
R R
S f kT
R R


.                                                                                                   (9) 
 
Due to linear superposition, the PSD shown in Eq. (9) represents the sum of the 
spectrum of two specific situations [4, 32]. Specifically, , 0, , 1, ,( ) ( ) ( )u c u c u cS f S f S f  , 
where: 
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2
1
0, , 0
0 1
( ) 4u c eff
R
S f kT R
R R
 
  
 
,                                                                                    (10) 
 
is the PSD of the channel noise voltage when only the noise generator due to 0R  is 
running, and  
 
2
0
1, , 1
0 1
( ) 4u c eff
R
S f kT R
R R
 
  
 
,                                                                                     (11) 
 
is the PSD of the channel noise voltage when only the noise generator due to 1R  is 
running. 
  When evaluating unconditional security in the ideal KLJN system, the following 
question may arise: could Eve discover the resistance values from the mean-square noise 
voltage and current measurements? The answer is yes. By measuring the mean-square 
noise voltage and current in the wire, Eve can use the theoretical values to set up a 
second order equation system and the two solutions will provide the resistance values for 
0R  and 1R , that is:
 
2
3
, , , ,
0,1
, ,
4 ( ) 4 ( ) 4 ( ) ( )
2 ( ) ( )
eff u c eff u c u c i c
u c i c
kT S f kT S f S f S f
R
S f S f
 
 . However, in 
order to extract the key bit, Eve needs to determine the exact location (Alice or Bob) of 
these resistances. 
  In order to find out the exact location of the resistors 0R  and 1R , Eve needs to 
measure and evaluate a physical quantity that provides directional information. 
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Fortunately, for the case of the ideal KLJN system, the only directional information 
available to Eve is the direction of the power flow [4, 32]. However, in accordance with 
the second law of thermodynamics and the energy conservation law, there is no net 
power flow in a closed system in thermal equilibrium. Consequently, the cross-
correlation between voltage and current in the channel is zero—i.e., 
1 0 0 1( ) ( ) 0c cP u t i t P P
 
     . This is easily proven by showing that the power 0 1P  
by which the noise generator due to resistor 0R  is heating resistor 1R  is equal to power 
1 0P  by which the noise generator due to resistor 1R  is heating resistor 0R  [4, 32]. This 
fact can be shown by using Eqs. (10) and (11) for the noise with bandwidth KLJNB  as 
follows: 
 
 
0, , 0 1
0 1 2
1 0 1
( )
4
u c KLJN
eff KLJN
S f B R R
P kT B
R R R
  

,                                                             (12) 
 
 
1, , 0 1
1 0 2
0 0 1
( )
4
u c KLJN
eff KLJN
S f B R R
P kT B
R R R
  

.                                                              (13) 
 
  It is important to mention that this security proof against passive (listening) 
attacks holds only for the ideal cases when Gaussian noise sources are being utilized [6]. 
This is because Gaussian noises possess the property that its PSD or autocorrelation 
function already provides the maximum information about the noise [30]. Also, it has 
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been recently shown that no security is offered with noise of other types of distributions 
[41]. 
 
1.2.4 Speed and range 
 
  Speed and range are two important technical details of the KLJN key exchange 
that need to be discussed. First of all, the noise bandwidth KLJNB  is determined by the 
distance L  between the two communicating parties. In other words, the following 
relationship must be satisfied: KLJNB ≪
c
L
—i.e., to satisfy the ‘no-wave limit” condition 
(quasi-static electrodynamics) [4]—where KLJNB  and c  are the bandwidth of the noise 
(i.e., the highest frequency cut-off in the ideal KLJN system) and the speed of the 
electromagnetic waves in the wire, respectively [30]. Second of all, the duration of the 
bit sharing period, denoted as  , must be long enough compared to the correlation time 
of the noise, denoted as KLJN , where 
1
KLJN
KLJNB
  , in order to achieve reasonable good 
statistics by correctly distinguishing between the different resistors situations [30]. In 
other words, the secure bit exchange rate _secBf  is much less than the noise bandwidth 
KLJNB , that is _secBf ≪ KLJNB , where _sec
1
2
Bf

 . 
  According to the experimental demonstration carried out in [31], high fidelity 
noise statistics are achieved when 50 KLJN   (i.e., when 0.02B KLJNf B , where Bf  is 
the bit exchange rate). Since a secure bit exchange occurs on average 50% of the time, 
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the secure bit sharing period is around sec 100 KLJN  . Moreover, the total time required 
to complete a KLJN secure key exchange depends on the length of the key. For example, 
if the key length is 100 bits, the total amount of time needed to complete a KLJN secure 
key exchange will be (on average) 10000 KLJN . This key stablishing rate may seem too 
slow. However, there is a tradeoff between the rate and the reachable level of security of 
this scheme. Besides, inexpensive techniques like building parallel channels by using 
chip technology and multi-wire cables have been proposed to improve the speed of this 
scheme [30]. Also, due to the small bit error probability [31], the system can afford to 
utilize PA algorithms to enhance the security of the system. 
 
1.2.5 Enhancing the security in non-ideal situations 
 
  The ideal KLJN system provides unconditional security against passive 
(listening) attacks. As we have pointed out, this security is guaranteed by the second law 
of thermodynamics. However, any deviation from the ideal circuitry can cause 
information leak toward Eve. These practical deviations include: parasitic components, 
non-ideal situations with finite distance, non-zero cable resistance and capacitance, non-
Gaussianity of the noise, active attacks by Eve, transient wave effects, etc. [2, 4, 30–32]. 
  The following techniques and protocols have been proposed to enhance the 
security of the KLJN system. 
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1.2.5.1 Defense method for non-idealities and active (invasive) attacks 
 
  Invasive (active) attacks to the KLJN system require the alteration of its physical 
properties. In order to protect against invasive attacks—and also against passive attacks 
on non-ideal systems—the KLJN system can continuously monitor or measure the 
instantaneous current and voltage at both sides of the wireline [4, 32, 38]. These 
measurements are then compared via an authenticated public channel, as shown in Fig. 
3. Therefore, any intruder causing changes in the circuitry and thus affecting the 
measurements will cause an alarm located at Alice and Bob to go off and alert the 
system of such intrusion. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Outline of the core KLJN system minimally armed against invasive (active) attacks or attacks 
utilizing non-ideal components and conditions. To detect the active (invasive) eavesdropper the 
instantaneous noise current and voltage amplitudes measured at the two ends of the line are compared via 
an authenticated public channel 
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  Note that the current and voltage measurement data contains all the information 
related to the key that Eve could have. Thus, it is impossible for Eve to extract key 
information without letting the communicating parties know of her activity. In 
consequence, Alice and Bob can decide whether or not to discard the compromised bits 
according to a previously agreed maximum level of information leak toward Eve [42]. 
 
1.2.5.2 Privacy amplification 
 
  To further enhance the security of the KLJN system and to try to reduce the 
amount of information leak that Eve can obtain about the key, a technique used in 
quantum communicators and called privacy amplification (PA) was analyzed [6]. PA is a 
software-based algorithm originally developed to improve the security in QKD systems 
[6]. The authors of [6] studied the effectiveness of utilizing one of the simplest PA 
techniques in several classical key distribution schemes, including the KLJN. This PA 
algorithm creates a new key by applying XOR operation between two consecutive bits of 
the original key. The new key has half the length of the original key and the 
Eavesdropper’s probability of successfully guessing the key bit converges to 0.5. When 
this probability is 0.5, Eve’s information about the key is zero since this is equivalent to 
obtaining her own key bits by tossing an unbiased random coin [6]. 
  Unfortunately, while PA reduces the probability of correct guessing by Eve, it 
also reduces the fidelity of the system by increasing the bit error probability if it is 
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originally grader than zero. Thus, to use PA, the bit error probability of Alice and Bob 
must be as small as possible [6]. 
 
1.2.5.3 Other advanced security features and protocols 
 
  Other advanced protocols and associated basic security techniques proposed up 
to now to compensate for non-idealities and to enhance security in the non-ideal KLJN 
system include [4]: 
 Selecting the values of Alice’s and Bob’s resistor pairs so that the wire resistance 
wireR  is negligible, that is  0 1,R R ≫ wireR  [31]. 
 Selecting the noise bandwidth versus the value of the wire resistance and wire 
capacitance in order to reduce information leak due to wire capacitance effects 
[2, 31]. 
 Low-pass line filters to provide “non-wave limit” condition in the cable and 
capacitor killer arrangement for cable capacitance compensation [31]. 
 Transient protocols such as random-walk of resistances starting at equal 
resistances [4, 39] or voltage ramping/timing to prevent transient effects at the 
beginning and at the end of the bit sharing period (BSP) [2, 31]. 
 Enhanced KLJN protocols, using Alice’s and Bob’s full knowledge of their own 
noise, for example the “intelligent” (iKLJN) to shorten the bit sharing period 
(BSP) which weakens Eve’s statistics [39]. 
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 Alice and Bob controlling the maximum information leak toward the 
Eavesdropper by calculating Eve’s information and limiting her maximum 
amount of statistical information about the key by dropping high-risk bits [42]. 
 Protocol using the KLJN key for fully encrypting a software-based key exchange 
to increase the security of exchanged keys in the case of repeated usage [43]. 
 
1.3 Bit Errors in the KLJN Key Exchange Scheme 
 
Because the working principle of the KLJN key exchange scheme is based on 
mean-square noise measurements, the study and evaluation of the uncertainties and the 
methods to reduce bit errors to a minimum are significantly important. 
Due to the finite duration of the bit sharing period (BSP), denoted as  , the 
measurement results of mean-square amplitudes have statistical inaccuracies [40]. As 
aforementioned, the time window   must be long-enough so that Alice and Bob can 
obtain sufficiently good statistics to safely distinguish between the different mean-square 
channel noise levels and, therefore, make the correct bit interpretation. 
  In the experimental demonstration carried out in [31], the authors were able to 
optimize the KLJN system to have fidelity of 99.98% (error probability 0.02%). 
However no mathematical analysis or design tools have been shown to address the error 
probability issue. Besides, as we have mentioned above, error analysis in the KLJN 
system is crucially important when a PA algorithm is being utilized. Because PA 
algorithms are error amplifiers, a low error probability is a pre-requirement. 
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The objectives concerning errors in the ideal KLJN key exchange scheme are 
twofold. First, an error analysis for the ideal KLJN system is provided. An estimate of 
the probability of each type of error in both the voltage-based and current-based 
measurement modes is derived [40, 44, 45]. Second, in order to ensure that errors are as 
small as reasonably possible, an error mitigation method is proposed [44, 45]. This error 
mitigation strategy will significantly reduce the error probabilities in the KLJN system, 
without the need of implementing any error correction technique. 
 
1.4 Vehicular Application for the KLJN Key Exchange Scheme 
 
The KLJN key exchange scheme can be considered a fairly new development. A 
great number of improvements [4, 6, 31, 32, 38, 39, 42] and applications [5, 43, 46, 47] 
have been proposed and developed for this key exchange scheme. Furthermore, there are 
many ongoing research projects (e.g., smart grid, communications in transportation 
systems, etc.) where security plays an important role, creating the possibility of new 
areas of applications for the KLJN key exchange system. 
During the last years, vehicular communication networks have become an 
emerging research topic. The main motivation for the deployment of more intelligent 
vehicular systems is the need to enhance transportation safety and efficiency. In this type 
of network, vehicles will be equipped with advanced sensing and computing capabilities 
where communication protocols will enable them to share information with each other 
and roadside infrastructure. The incorporation of this new range of technology will 
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create a smart network where every vehicle is aware of its surrounding environment. In 
fact, a great number of applications are under development to improve traffic safety and 
mobility, and perform financial transactions (e.g., toll collection).These new features 
will, at some level, improve the quality of life of people and will help to alleviate 
environmental issues such as pollution and the waste of non-renewable fossil energy 
[48]. 
 
1.4.1 Vehicular communication network architecture 
 
A typical vehicular communication network is shown in Fig. 4 [49–54]. As 
summarized in previous publications [49–54], Vehicles, Roadside Devices (RSDs), and 
Certification Authorities (CAs) are the three basic nodes in most of vehicular 
communication networks. Vehicles are mobile terminal nodes in charge of collecting 
road and traffic information, reporting events to the CAs through the RSDs, and 
exchanging warning messages with nearby vehicles. The RSDs are intermediate nodes in 
charge of transferring messages between vehicles and CAs. The CAs are the host nodes 
that manage information related to vehicles. These nodes also generate secure keys and 
provide certifications for all vehicles in the network, control message exchanges of the 
whole network, and distribute information obtained outside the local vehicular 
communication network. Accordingly, the types of communication within vehicular 
communication networks include [49–54]: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-
Roadside-Device (V2RSD), and Vehicle-to-Certification-Authority (V2CA). 
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Figure 4 A typical vehicular communication network. Three basic nodes are encountered in this type of 
network: Vehicles, Roadside Devices (RSDs), and Certification Authorities (CAs). The types of 
communication within vehicular communication networks include [49–51]: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), 
Vehicle-to-Roadside-Device (V2RSD), and Vehicle-to-Certification-Authority (V2CA) 
 
 
 
The V2V and V2RSD communications use wireless technology, typically the 
IEEE 802.11p [55], which is an adjustment made to the IEEE 802.11 standard and it has 
been integrated in the 5GHz dedicated short range communication (DSRC) [55, 56] to 
add wireless access in a vehicular environment (WAVE) [56, 57]. V2V and V2RSD 
communications commonly include frequent safety-related messages (warnings) to give 
the drivers the necessary time to prevent and detect dangerous situations. The V2CA 
communication requires both wireless and wireline technology, where the RSD links to a 
wired network connecting the vehicles to the CA. V2CA communication normally 
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includes messages requesting new keys and/or signatures to establish a secure 
communication with other vehicles or RSDs. 
 
1.4.2 Key exchange schemes in vehicular communication networks
 
 
Even though the integration of new technology and the levels of interconnectivity 
make the vehicular communication network a more reliable and efficient system, it 
might also create new vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit. Since a vehicular 
system is a widely dispersed network, its communication infrastructure represents a 
potential target for malicious users. For instance, an attacker could disseminate false 
information that could affect the decisions of other drivers. Such attacks could lead to 
disastrous events such as fatal accidents. Also, a malicious user could monitor the 
position and/or trajectory of a specific vehicle or listen to financial transactions to steal 
personal and/or credit card information. Therefore, the safe and successful operation of a 
vehicular communication network requires the design of very robust security 
architecture that ensures the protection of private user information without affecting the 
correct operation of the entire system. 
Most of the existing security mechanisms for vehicular communications use a 
software-based key and signature generation and distribution. This means that their 
performance is based on the assumption that eavesdroppers trying to gain access to 
security-related information possess limited computational power. Strictly speaking, 
these techniques offer only computationally conditional security [1]. Therefore, if 
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eavesdroppers can increase their computational power, the keys and digital signatures 
might be extracted. This would allow them to intercept all the communication between 
the transmitter and receiver. 
CAs manage and store very important information associated to vehicles and 
RSDs, such as location information tables, node identities, and credentials. Before 
initiating the information exchange with another vehicle or with a RSD, a vehicle needs 
to obtain security-related information (e.g., certificates) in order to be considered 
authentic. In this case, the vehicle first communicates with the RSD which then links the 
vehicle to the CA by using a wireline connection. If this wireline communication is 
intercepted on the way to/from the CA, important information could be given away. 
Thus, securing both the V2RSD and RSD2CA communication channels is necessary. 
Though there is plenty of research on securing the V2RSD communication, very 
little attention has been devoted to secure the wireline RSD2CA communication. 
Therefore, another objective of this dissertation is to introduce a vehicular 
communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the 
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme [52]. The secure KLJN 
key donation to vehicles is also addressed [58]. The lifetime of the KLJN key in 
vehicular communication networks is a very important technical parameter that needs to 
be discussed. This is because the longer the KLJN key is used; the more susceptible it is 
to attacks. Therefore, an upper limit for the lifetime of this key is also provided [58]. 
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2. ANALYSIS OF THE BIT ERRORS IN THE KLJN SECURE KEY 
EXCHANGE SCHEME
*
 
 
This section classifies and analyzes the different types of errors—due to 
statistical inaccuracies in noise measurements—within the voltage-based and current-
based measurement modes of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key 
exchange scheme. It also presents a method to efficiently reduce these errors without the 
need of implementing any error correction technique. This section is a summary of 
recent findings presented in Saez and Kish, 2013 [40], Saez et al., 2014 [44], and Saez et 
al., 2014 [45]. 
 
2.1 Mean-square Noise Measurement Process and Bit Interpretation 
 
Assuming ideal components/conditions, we proceed as in earlier works [40, 44, 
45]. First, let us assume that Alice and Bob measure either the mean-square channel 
noise voltage or the mean-square channel noise current amplitude, i.e., 
2 ( ) 4
A B
c eff KLJN
A B
R R
u t kT B
R R


 or 2
1
( ) 4c eff KLJN
A B
i t kT B
R R


, respectively, where 
                                                 
*
Part of this section is a modified reprinted version of: Y. Saez and L. B. Kish, Errors and their mitigation 
at the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure key exchange, PLoS ONE 8 (2013) e81103 (7 pages), © 2013 
Saez and Kish. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: Journal of. 
Computational Electronics, Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the 
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange, 13, 2014, 271–277, Y. Saez, L. B. Kish, R. Mingesz, 
Z. Gingl, and C. G. Granqvist, © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013. 
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2 ( )cu t  and 
2 ( )ci t   indicate finite-time average of the square of the channel noise 
voltage and current, respectively. 
 It is important to mention that during the BSP only the duration   is available for 
Alice, Bob, and Eve to determine the mean-square channel noise; because, after that, a 
new bit exchange begins. 
Figure 5 shows a block diagram to illustrate the measurement process in both 
measurement modes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Mean-square channel noise voltage and current measurement process. Q  and D  are calibration 
coefficients of the squaring device to provide a Volt unit with the correct numerical value for the squaring 
operation 
 
 
 
 The measurement process is a follows. First, the channel noise enters into a 
squaring unit (analog or digital circuits). At its output, the signal is still voltage (because 
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the squaring unit employs voltage-signal-based electronics). Thus, for the voltage-based 
measurement mode, the numerical value of the instantaneous amplitude at the output of 
the squaring unit is equal to the square of the instantaneous amplitude of the input 
voltage. However, for the sake of simplicity and without losing generality, in the 
current-based measurement mode we assume that the numerical values of the voltage 
correspond to the measured current. Thus, we keep the current-based notation as if the 
electronics would be a current-based signal system. In other words, the voltages are 
calibrated so that the numerical values are the same as those of the current. These facts 
are mathematically expressed by the instantaneous amplitudes 2 ( )cDu t  and 2 ( )cQi t , 
where 
1
Volt
D   and 
1
Amper
Q  are the transfer coefficients of the hypothetical 
multiplier device to provide a Volt/Amper unit also for the square value [59]. 
 The instantaneous amplitudes then enter an averaging unit and after averaging for 
the finite-time duration  , the obtained measurement results are 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )c cDu t Du t t    and 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )c cQi t Qi t i t   , for the voltage-based mode 
and current-based mode, respectively. In other words, the measured mean-square 
channel noise voltage and current have a DC component—i.e., the ideal infinite-time 
averages 2 ( )cDu t  and 2 ( )cQi t , respectively—and a superimposed AC component—
i.e., ( )t  and ( )i t , respectively—remaining after the finite-time average. This 
averaging process can be represented as a low-pass filtering with a cut-off frequency Bf  
inversely proportional to  , i.e.,
1
Bf

 . 
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 While 2 ( )cDu t  and 2 ( )cQi t  are not Gaussians, the AC components ( )t  and 
( )i t  are Gaussians with high accuracy [59]. This follows from central limit theorem 
(CLT) because the finite duration   is much longer than the correlation time of the AC 
components of 2 ( )cDu t  and 2 ( )cQi t  before averaging since Bf ≪ KLJNB . 
Figure 6 illustrates the three possible levels of the measured mean-square 
channel noise voltage and current for the 11, 01/10, and 00 bit situations. The solid lines 
denote exact (infinite) time averages while the random fluctuations around them 
represent the finite-time averages components. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Measured mean-square channel noise of voltage (a) and current (b). 211( )u t  , 
2
01/10 ( )u t  , 
2
00 ( )u t  , and 
2
11( )i t  , 
2
01/10 ( )i t  , 
2
00 ( )i t   are the measured mean-square channel noise voltage and 
current at the 11, 01/10, and 00 bit situations, respectively. The scales are arbitrary. Solid lines denote 
exact (infinite) time average results. For the sake of simplicity we assume 0R R  and 1R R , 
 
with  
 ≫1. ( 1 2,  ) and ( 3 4,  ) are the thresholds for interpreting the measured mean-square voltage and 
current values, respectively 
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 With a low probability, the random fluctuations in the measured mean-square 
channel noise voltage and current can cross from one mean-square noise level to another 
and cause Alice and Bob to make incorrect bit interpretations which will trigger a bit 
error. 
The threshold values 1 , 2  and 3 , 4 , are used to determine the boundaries 
between the different interpretations of the measured mean-square channel noise 
voltages and currents, respectively, over the time window  . The bit interpretations of 
the measured mean-square channel noise voltage and current are 00 when 
2 2
100( ) ( )cu t u t    and 
2 2
400( ) ( )ci t i t   , respectively. The interpretations are 
11 when 2 2 211( ) ( )cu t u t    and 
2 2
311( ) ( )ci t i t   , respectively. The secure bit 
situations 01/10 are interpreted as such when 2 2 21 200 11( ) ( ) ( )cu t u t u t     and 
2 2 2
3 411 00( ) ( ) ( )ci t i t i t    , respectively. 
 
2.2 Types of Errors in the KLJN Key Exchange Scheme 
 
  Bit errors occur when Alice and Bob make incorrect bit interpretations due to the 
statistical inaccuracies (random fluctuations) in the measured mean-square noise voltage 
and/or current. An example of a bit error is the rare occurrence when the finite-time 
mean-square voltage of the 00 bit situation is interpreted as the 01/10 bit situation. There 
are different types of errors situations, as shown in Table 2. 
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 According to Table 2, it is apparent that two types of errors need to be addressed: 
the 11==>01/10 errors—i.e., the errors when the actual non-secure bit situation 11 is 
interpreted as the secure bit situation 01/10—and the 00==>01/10 errors occurring 
when the actual situation 00 is interpreted as 01/10. Also, notice that some of the errors 
situations, as shown in Table 2, are considered to be auto-corrected by the protocol. This 
is because, as aforementioned, the 00 and 11 bit situations are automatically discarded 
by the system. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Types of errors in the KLJN key exchange scheme 
  Actual Situation 
  00 11 01/10 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
 
(D
ec
is
io
n
) 
00 Correct (no error) Error, removed 
(automatically) 
Error, removed 
(automatically) 
11 Error, removed 
(automatically) 
Correct (no error) Error, removed 
(automatically) 
01/10 Error (probability?) Error (probability?) Correct (no error) 
 
 
 
2.3 Mathematical Approach 
 
 The error probabilities in the ideal KLJN key exchange scheme can be estimated 
with the probability that AC components ( )t  and/or ( )i t  are crossing specific 
thresholds during the time interval  . For instance, the probability of the 00==>01/10 
type errors in the voltage-based measurement mode is the probability that the AC 
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component remaining after the finite-time average of 2 ( )cDu t  defined as 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )c ct Du t Du t     is beyond the threshold 1 , i.e., 1( )t   . Similarly, the 
probability of the 11==>01/10 type of errors in the current measurement mode is the 
probability that ( )i t  is beyond threshold 3 , i.e., 3( )i t   , (see Fig. 6). These 
probabilities can be evaluated from the error function; however, this approach would 
require numerical integration. Thus, we follow a different approach [40, 44, 45] by using 
Rice’s formula for threshold crossings [60, 61]. 
 To have an analytic formula, which is a good approximation and has the exact 
scaling in the small error probability limit, we can use the Rice formula of threshold 
crossing frequency [60, 61]; see similar solutions for estimating the probability of 
thermal noise induced switching errors [62–64]. The estimation of error probability is 
based on the fact that, in the small error limit, the probability of repeated threshold 
crossings within the correlation time of the band-limited noise converges to zero. The 
correlation time of ( )t  and ( )i t  is also equal to  , thus each threshold crossing (in a 
chosen but fixed direction) indicates an independent error. The product of the mean 
threshold crossing frequency of a specific threshold  , where  1 2 3 4, , ,     , 
denoted as ( )  , times the finite duration  —i.e., the duration of the BSP—is a good 
estimation of the error probabilities in this limit [62, 63]. 
 The predictions of the Rice formula were compared with the prediction based on 
numerically evaluated error function and it was found that the Rice formula always gave 
more pessimistic error estimation. The variation of the threshold resulted in changing the 
 34 
 
error probability predicted by the Rice formula and the error function by factors of 
4310  and 4410 , respectively. In the large error probability situation, the Rice formula 
predicted about 2 times greater error while, in the low error probability situation, about 
18 times greater error. This is a negligible difference not only due to the 43 4410 10
variation during the study but also because the exact error probability slightly depends 
on the fine details of the protocol not discussed here. To have analytic error estimation, 
we proceed as follows. 
 
2.3.1 General approach 
 
We assume that   is the threshold value used to determine the boundaries 
between the different interpretations of the AC component remaining after the average 
time window  . This threshold value varies for different mean-square channel noise 
voltages and currents. However, for the sake of simplicity and without losing generality, 
in this general approach we are going use   for both voltage and current measurements. 
The AC component can be ( )t  and/or ( )i t , depending on the quantity being 
measured, voltage or current, respectively. We define , , ( )ACS f   and , , ( )AC iS f  as the 
power spectral densities of ( )t  and ( )i t , respectively. Then, according to Rice [60], 
the mean frequency   of crossing the level   by these Gaussians ( )t  and ( )i t , with 
power spectral densities , , ( )ACS f   and , , ( )AC iS f  can be given as: 
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 
2
2
, ,
2 0
2
exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2
ACf S f df 
 

 
 
   
 
                                                                    (14) 
 
and 
 
 
2
2
, ,
2 0
2
exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2
AC if S f df
i i

 

 
   
 
 ,                                                                     (15) 
 
respectively. Where , ,
0
ˆ ( )ACS f df  

   and ,i,0
ˆ ( )ACi S f df 

   are the RMS 
values of ( )t  and ( )i t , respectively. The threshold value   is defined, for 
normalization purposes, as a fraction of the DC component of the measured mean-square 
channel noise voltage and/or current, namely: 
 
2
,( ) ( )c u c KLJNDu t DS f B                                                                                      (16) 
 
and 
 
2
,( ) ( )c i c KLJNQi t QS f B    ,                                                                                   (17) 
 
for 0 1   and 0 1  , respectively. , ( )u cS f and , ( )i cS f  are the power density 
spectrum of the channel voltage and current noises, respectively. 
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  In order to compute , , ( )ACS f   and , , ( )AC iS f , we follow the approach given in 
[59]. According to [59], the power spectral densities , ( )ACS f and , ( )AC iS f  of the AC 
components of the non-averaged quantities 2 ( )cDu t  and 2 ( )cQi t  are: 
 
2 2
, ,( ) 2 ( ) 1
2
AC KLJN u c
KLJN
f
S f D B S f
B

 
  
 
for 0 2 KLJNf B                                          (18) 
 
and 
 
2 2
, ,( ) 2 ( ) 1
2
AC i KLJN i c
KLJN
f
S f Q B S f
B
 
  
 
 for 0 2 KLJNf B  .                                        (19) 
 
And , ( ) 0ACS f   and , ( ) 0AC iS f   otherwise, respectively.  
 The low-pass filtering effect of the time averaging cuts off these spectrums for 
Bf f  but keeps them for Bf f . Since Bf ≪ KLJNB , the values of , ( )ACS f and 
, ( )AC iS f  within the frequency band Bf  can be approximated by its maximum, that is 
, , ,( ) (0)AC ACS f S    and , , ,( ) (0)AC i AC iS f S  , respectively.  
 Figures 7 and 8 summarize these findings for the voltage-based measurement 
mode. Similar results can be found for the current-based measurement mode. 
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Figure 7 Power spectral density (PSD) of the product of two independent noise voltages 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 PSD of the AC component remaining after the average time window   in the voltage-based 
measurement mode 
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 Let us define 
KLJN
B
B
f
  . Then, the RMS values ˆ  and iˆ  are: 
 
2 2 2
, , , ,
0
ˆ ( ) (0) 2 ( )AC B AC u cBS f df f S D f S f    

                                               (20) 
 
and 
 
2 2 2
, , , ,
0
ˆ ( ) (0) 2 ( )AC i B AC i i cBi S f df f S Q f S f  

   ,                                               (21) 
 
respectively. 
 The frequency of unidirectional level crossings ( )   is half of the level 
crossing frequency predicted by the Rice formula. In the voltage-based measurement 
mode ( )   is given by: 
 
 
2
2
, ,
2 0
1
exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2
ACf S f df 
 

 


 
   
 
 .                                                                 (22) 
 
In the current-based measurement mode ( )   is given by: 
 
 
2
2
, ,
2 0
1
exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2
AC if S f df
i i

 



 
   
 
 .                                                                    (23) 
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 From Eqs. (14)–(23), we obtain that the frequency of unidirectional level 
crossings in the voltage-based and current-based measurement modes are: 
 
 
2
exp
43
Bf  

 
   
 
                                                                                                (24) 
 
and  
 
 
2
exp
43
Bf  

 
   
 
,                                                                                              (25) 
 
respectively. In the high threshold situation the errors follow a Poisson statistics, thus the 
error probability during the time interval   is equal to the expected numbers of errors 
within this interval provided this number is much less than 1. Thus, the probabilities in 
the voltage-based measurement mode and the current-based measurement mode, denoted 
as u  and i , respectively, in the case of ,u i  ≪1 are: 
 
2( ) 1
( ) exp
43
u
Bf
  
   
  
     
 
                                                                         (26) 
 
and 
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2( ) 1
( ) exp
43
i
Bf
  
   
  
     
 
.                                                                        (27) 
 
2.4 Probabilities of the Different Types of Errors 
 
  In this section, the threshold values 1 , 2 and 3 , 4  have meanings that are 
similar to the one of the threshold value   in the general approach presented above and 
are also defined as a fraction of the corresponding DC component of the measured 
mean-square channel noise voltage and current, namely: 21 00( )Du t   for 0 1  , 
2
2 11( )Du t   for 0 1  , 23 11( )Qi t   for 0 1  , and 24 00( )Qi t   for 
0 1  . Where 200 ( )Du t , 211( )Du t , 200 ( )Qi t , and 211( )Qi t  are the DC components 
of the measured mean-square channel noise voltage and current at the 00 and 11 bit 
situations, respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Statistical errors in the voltage-based measurement mode 
 
  Substituting 1  and 2  in the general approach, we find that the probabilities 
,00u  and ,11u  of the 00==>01/10 and 11==>01/10 types of errors in voltage 
measurements for ,00 ,11,u u  ≪1 are: 
 
2
1
,00 1
( ) 1
( ) exp
43
u
Bf
  
   
  
     
 
for 0 1                                              (28) 
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and 
 
2
2
,11 2
( ) 1
( ) exp
43
u
Bf
  
   
  
     
 
for 0 1  ,                                           (29) 
 
respectively. 
 
2.4.2 Statistical errors in the current-based measurement mode 
 
  Similarly, by substituting 3  and 4  in the general approach, we find that the 
error probabilities ,00i  and ,11i  of the 11==>01/10 and 00==>01/10 types of errors in 
the current measurements are: 
 
2
3
,00 3
( ) 1
( ) exp
43
i
Bf
  
   
  
     
 
for 0 1                                                (30) 
 
and 
 
2
4
,11 4
( ) 1
( ) exp
43
i
Bf
  
   
  
     
 
for 0 1  ,                                             (31) 
 
respectively. 
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 It should be noticed that—for both the voltage-based and the current-based 
measurement modes—the error probabilities are exponential functions of two important 
parameters: the parameter  , which shows that the error probability decays 
exponentially with increasing magnitude of  , and the parameter defining the value of 
the respective threshold, i.e.,  ,   and  ,   in the in the voltage-based and current-
based methods, respectively. 
 
2.4.3 Illustration of results with practical parameters 
 
 To demonstrate the results and to have an estimate of how large these errors are, 
we assign possible practical values to the parameters. We varied   from 50 to 250, and 
gave   three different values between 0 and 1. The bit error probability ,00u  of the 
00==>01/10 type of errors in voltage-based measurement mode for ,00u ≪1 is shown in 
Fig. 9. 
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Figure 9 Probability of the 00==>01/10 type of errors in voltage measurements 
 
 
 
  Figure 9 shows that for a fixed value of  , by increasing   (and consequently 
increasing the value of the threshold 1  used to determine this type of error), we can 
significantly reduce this probability. This figure also shows how increasing the   
parameter (and thus the time average window  ) will result in a substantial reduction of 
this error probability. It is important to note that no error correction algorithm is used for 
this error reduction. 
 It should be mentioned that in the current-based mode, for the case of  ≫1, the 
mean-square noise level at 11 is closer to the level at 01/10 than to the level at 00 (cf., 
Fig. 3 as an illustration). Therefore, the bit error probability ,00i  for the 00==>01/10 
type of errors will be significantly smaller than the bit error probability ,11i  for the 
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11==>01/10 type of errors. This situation is the opposite for the case of the voltage-
based method [40]. Accordingly, the experimental test of the KLJN scheme [31] used 
either the voltage or the current data for decision, depending of which scheme gave the 
smaller bit error probability. 
 
2.5 A Proposed Error Removal Method
 
 
In this section we examine a new error removal strategy, which utilizes both 
voltage and current measurements without applying any error correction algorithm. 
 Let us assume that Alice and Bob measure both 2 ( )cu t   and 
2 ( )ci t   at the same 
time. In an ideal error-free situation, the same bit interpretations ensue from both mean-
square channel noise amplitudes. However, the bit interpretations can differ when there 
are errors, because the AC components of the measured mean-square channel noise 
voltage and current are statistically independent due to the second law of 
thermodynamics and its Gaussian nature (when the cross-correlation between two 
Gaussian processes with zero mean is zero, the two processes are statistically 
independent). 
 To eliminate errors, we select the cumulative measurement output that has the 
smallest error associated with it; see Fig. 6 and Table 3. We make use of the fact that, in 
the bit situation when the current evaluation method has maximum error probability, the 
voltage-based method has minimum error probability, and vice versa. 
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Table 3 KLJN error removal method with combined voltage-current analysis 
  Voltage measurement interpretation 
  00 11 01/10 
C
u
rr
e
n
t 
m
ea
su
re
m
e
n
t 
In
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
 00 00  
(Insecure/ Discard) 
Discard 
( check attack) 
00 
(Insecure/ Discard) 
11 Discard  
(check attack) 
11 
(Insecure/ Discard) 
11 
(Insecure/ Discard) 
01/10 00 
(Insecure/ Discard) 
11 
(Insecure/ Discard) 
01/10 
(Secure) 
 
 
 
 The only output that is kept is when both the current-based method and voltage-
based method bit interpretations are secure, i.e., when both are 01/10. For instance, 
suppose that the bit interpretation obtained from the current measurement is 00 and that 
the bit interpretation for the voltage measurement is 01/10. In this case, we assume 00 as 
the correct bit interpretation and hence discard the bit. 
 
2.5.1 Error probabilities in the combined voltage-current analysis method 
  
The AC components of the mean-square noise voltage and current mean-square 
noises are independent as a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics and the 
Gaussianity of thermal noise [4, 32, 39], and hence the probability of errors in the 
combined current-voltage analysis method is given by the product of the error 
probabilities in the current-based and voltage-based methods. 
  As reported in section 2.4, the probability ,00u  of the 00==>01/10 type of errors 
in the voltage-based method is 
2
,00
1
exp
43
u
 

 
  
 
 for 0 1  , and the probability 
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,00i  of the 00==>01/10 type of errors in the current-based method is 
2
,00
1
exp
43
i
 

 
  
 
 for 0 1  . Thus, the probability ,00t  of the 00==>01/10 type 
of errors in the combined method is given by: 
 
2 2
,00 ,00 ,00
1 ( )
exp
3 4
t u i
  
  
  
   
 
for 0 1   and 0 1  .                              (32) 
 
This error probability is an exponential function of the parameters  ,  , and  . 
  By following the same procedure as above, we find that the probability ,11t  of 
the 11==>01/10 type of errors in the combined voltage-current method is also 
exponential and is given by: 
 
2 2
,11 ,11 ,11
1 ( )
exp
3 4
t u i
  
  
  
   
 
for 0 1   and 0 1  .                                (33) 
 
2.5.2 Illustration of the results with practical parameters 
 
  To demonstrate the results for the bit error probabilities in the error removal 
method, we assign practical values to the parameters  ,  , and  . We choose again
50 250  , and set 0.5   and 0.8   (this is because, as aforementioned, the bit 
error probability ,00i  is significantly smaller than the bit error probabilities ,00u  and 
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,11i ). Figure 10 illustrates the results. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Probability of the 00==>01/10 type of errors in the combined voltage-current method 
 
 
 
  As notice in Fig.10, by increasing the duration of the bit exchange period, i.e.,  , 
we can drastically decrease this error probability without the need of implementing any 
error correction technique/algorithm. 
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3. VEHICULAR APPLICATION OF THE KLJN SECURE KEY EXCHANGE 
SCHEME
*
 
 
In this section, we propose the use of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) 
scheme to enhance the security of key exchange in vehicular communication systems. 
We focus primarily on providing a new network architecture with KLJN-based 
unconditionally secure key exchange, and describe the KLJN key generation and 
donation to vehicles. Also, an upper limit of the KLJN key lifetime is estimated. This 
section is a summary of recent findings presented in Saez et al., 2014 [54] and Cao et al., 
2015 [58]. 
 
3.1 Unconditionally Secure Key Exchange for Vehicular Communication Networks 
 
3.1.1 Existing key exchange techniques 
 
In order to solve the fundamental security-related issues for promising vehicular 
communication network applications, several security protocols have been proposed by 
different researchers. In [65, 66], the authors proposed a security infrastructure that is 
based on public key infrastructure (PKI). Later, other solutions based on PKI were 
                                                 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from: Y. Saez, X. Cao, L. B. Kish, and G. Pesti, 
Securing Vehicle Communication Systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol, Fluctuation and Noise 
Letters 13 (2014) 1450020 (14 pages), © World Scientific Publishing Company 2014.  
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from: X. Cao, Y. Saez, G. Pesti, and L. B. Kish, On 
KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks, Fluctuation and Noise Letters. 
14 (2015) 1550008 (11 pages), © World Scientific Publishing Company 2015. 
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proposed [67–70]. The authors of [67] provided a “lightweight” authenticated key 
scheme that integrates blind signature techniques for V2V and V2RSD communications. 
In [68], the authors presented an approach that combines the traditional PKI and 
identity-based public key cryptography for vehicular communication networks. In [69], a 
secure scheme with session keys (pairwise and group keys) used in non-safety-related 
applications (e.g. “chatting in platoon”) was designed. In [70], temporary anonymous 
certified keys (TACKs) were constructed, and a key management scheme based on 
TACKs was proposed for vehicular communication networks. Besides PKI, group 
signatures are another important category of proposed security methods. Based on the 
strong Diffie-Hellman and linear assumptions, the authors of [71] introduced the under-
200 bytes group signature scheme that has a similar security level to the RSA (Rivest, 
Shamir, and Adleman public-key cryptosystem) signature of the same length. A group 
signature-based protocol using tamper-resistance devices and a probabilistic signature 
verification scheme was proposed in [72]. In [73], the authors constructed an identity-
based batch verification scheme for V2RSD communication in vehicular communication 
networks. In [74], a software-based roadside unit-aided messages authentication protocol 
for V2V communications was proposed. In addition, a software-based solution that uses 
secure and privacy enhancing communication schemes for vehicular sensor networks 
was provided in [75]. 
 Most of the above security schemes or protocols are constructed based on 
software encryption mechanisms. The security on these software-based methods is based 
on the premise that the eavesdroppers have limited computational power. Thus, these 
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security schemes offer just a computationally conditional security [1, 2, 4, 7, 30]. 
Moreover, these architectures focus their attention on V2V or V2RSD communications 
and although there is significant information transmitted in the Roadside-Device-to-
Certification-Authority (RSD2CA) communication [54], it is very rare to find works 
related to securing this particular communication channel. 
In vehicular communication systems, where security has taken an increasingly 
important role, there is a need for a new key exchange scheme that can approach a 
perfect security level. Therefore, we outline how the KLJN system could theoretically be 
used to achieve unconditionally secure keys to secure vehicular communication 
networks. 
 
3.2 Vehicular Communication Network Model with Unconditionally Secure Key 
Exchange 
 
Before comprehending the unconditionally secure key exchange for vehicular 
communication systems, we should first describe our proposed network model. The 
main goal of this new model is to generate and distribute information theoretically 
secure keys that are later used to secure information prior to transmission. An abstract 
view of this vehicular communication architecture, with nodes and authorities, is shown 
in Fig. 11. 
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Figure 11 Vehicular communication network with unconditionally secure key exchange. The network 
nodes remain the same except for a new node: the roadside key provider (RSKP) and extra wires for KLJN 
key exchange between the CA and RSD and/or RSKP. The existing wirelines between the RSDs/RSKPs 
and the CA are kept for high speed communication purposes 
 
 
 
As noticed in Fig. 11, very few changes have been made to the existing vehicular 
communication architecture (see Fig. 4). The network nodes remain almost the same 
except for a new node: the roadside key provider (RSKP). The RSKP is in charge of 
providing the cars with unconditionally secure keys via a near field communication 
technology. 
Another change in the network topology is that the RSD2CA communication 
now utilizes an extra wire for KLJN key exchange. The existing wire line between the 
RSD and the CA can be kept for high speed communication purposes. Also, an extra 
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wire line between the RSKP and the CA has been included to transmit safety and 
mobility-related messages. 
Table 4 shows a summary of the type of communications between the different 
nodes in the proposed vehicular communication network with unconditional secure key 
exchange. It also shows the communication technology utilized and the points at which 
the KLJN system will be used. 
 
 
 
Table 4 Communications in the vehicular network model with unconditionally secure key exchange 
Type of Communication Communication Technology KLJN system 
V2V Wireless Communication No 
V2RSD and/or RSD2V Wireless Communication No 
V2CA and/or CA2V 
 
Wireless Communication (V2RSD or 
RSD2V) and Wireline Communication 
(RSD2CA or CA2RSD) 
Yes (wireline 
segment) 
CA2RSKP and/orRSKP2CA Wireline Communication Yes 
RSKP2V Close Proximity Communication No 
 
 
 
Under this secure key distribution solution, each node (i.e., vehicle and RSDs) 
will be assigned a key that does not contain any information related to the identity of a 
vehicle so user’s privacy is preserved. This key will unconditionally secure the 
information that one node sends to another across the vehicular network. For instance, 
before a vehicle sends a message, it first signs it with its unconditionally secure key. The 
receiver of the message has to extract and verify the key of the sender. The protocol used 
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for message authentication and key verification is out of the scope of this dissertation 
and will be considered in future works. 
 
3.3 KLJN Key Generation in Vehicular Communication Networks 
 
According to the vehicular communication network model with unconditional 
secure key distribution proposed in [54], there is a KLJN line connecting the 
Certification Authority (CA) to the Roadside Devices (RSDs) and Roadside Key 
Providers (RSKPs) (see Fig. 11). 
The KLJN key generation process is performed as follows: 
 When a vehicle needs a secure key, it sends a message (via wireless 
communication) to the closest RSKP with the key request.  
 The RSKP will use the extra wire (i.e., the high speed communication line) to 
inform the CA in charge about the key request.  
 A key generation process will take place between the RSKP and the CA.  
 The RSKP will then provide the cars with the unconditional secure keys by 
using a near field communication wireless technology [54].  
 The RSDs also use their KLJN lines that connect them to the CA to generate 
KLJN keys that are used to secure the communication between RSDs and the 
CA. 
Note that the KLJN line is used only to secretly generate and share the KLJN 
keys that are going to be used to secure the communication between two nodes. The rest 
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of the communication is performed either via wireless communication or using a high 
speed communication wireline. 
 
3.4 KLJN Key Donation in Vehicular Communication Networks 
 
As pointed out in [54], the RSKP could be visualized as a gate. The 
communication channel used in this key distribution can be supported by a close 
proximity communication technology such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) 
[76–78], near field communication (NFC) [78], and/or near field magnetic induction 
communication (see Fig. 12 for an illustration)[79]. Near field magnetic induction 
communication utilizes an inductive coupling. The operating frequency range is centered 
on 13.56 MHz on ISO/IEC 18000-3 air interface and offers data transmission rates 
ranging from 106 kbit/s to 424 kbit/s within a distance of approximately 10 centimeters 
or less [80]. 
 Since close proximity communication technologies utilize a wireless 
communication interface, eavesdropping is an important issue [81]. An unauthorized 
third party could use an antenna to listen the transmitted signals. In order to provide 
protection against eavesdropping and data modification attack, a secure channel can be 
established [81, 82]. The authors of [81] proposed a NFC specific key agreement. This 
key agreement does not require any asymmetric cryptography thus reducing the 
computational requirements significantly. In [82], a key agreement protocol between a 
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reader and a tag that is resistant in presence of passive adversaries in RFID 
communication was proposed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Abstract illustration of roadside key providers delivering an unconditionally secure key to 
vehicles via near field communication. Similar to the transformer principle, the magnetic near-field of two 
conductor coils is used to couple the initiator device (located at the RSKP) and listening device (located at 
the vehicle) [80]. Modulation schemes used include: amplitude on/off keying (OOK) with different 
modulation depth (100 % or 10 %) and Binary phase-shift keying (BPSK)[80] 
 
 
 
It is important to mention that the aforementioned RSKP key donation, where 
RSKPs were visualized as gates [54], might not be as efficient as expected. This is 
because vehicles would have to slow down in order to get sufficiently close to the 
RSKPs (as proximity is needed for secure key donation). Therefore, we also propose a 
lane-by-lane key donation using RSKP equipment embedded in the pavement. In this 
way, vehicles will not have to slow down to obtain their keys. To detect vehicles in each 
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lane, either loop detectors [83] or high-definition digital wave radars [84] deployed on 
the side of the roadway can be used. Both the RSKPs and the radar units can be 
connected to RSDs through a high speed wireline connection. Thus, the KLJN key 
generation is performed between RSDs and the CA only, while the RSKP will be only in 
charge of providing the cars with the unconditionally secure KLJN keys. Moreover, this 
key donation process would be encrypted with the former key, therefore, even if an 
eavesdropper is listening, he/she would not be able to extract the key information unless 
he/she has the former key. Figure 13 illustrates this solution. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Key donation to vehicles with RSKP equipment embedded in the pavement. RSKPs are located 
underground of each lane
 
 
 
 
3.5 Upper Limit of the KLJN Key Lifetime in Vehicular Communication Networks
 
 
The lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks is a very 
important technical parameter that needs to be discussed. This is because the longer the 
KLJN key is used, the more susceptible it is to attacks. 
In order to find out the lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication 
networks, we proceed as follows. First of all, the noise bandwidth KLJNB  is determined 
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by the distance L  between the two communicating parties, which in the case of 
vehicular communication networks depends on the length of the KLJN line segment 
between RSDs and the CA. Thus, the following relationship must be satisfied [30]: 
KLJNB ≪
c
L
, where c  is the speed of electromagnetic waves in the wireline. Suppose that 
0< ≪1 and the noise bandwidth is: 
 
KLJN
c
B
L
  .                                                                                            (34) 
 
  Also, the duration of the bit sharing period   must be long enough compared to 
the correlation time of the noise KLJN , i.e.,
1
KLJN
KLJNB
  , in order to correctly 
distinguish between the different resistors situations [40, 44]. The frequency of secure 
bit exchange is: 
 
sec
1
2
KLJNB
f

 ,                                                                                                                (35) 
 
where  ≫1 (see [44, 45]) and the factor 
1
2
 is due to the fact that a secure bit exchange 
occurs (on average) 50% of the time. 
  The lifetime of the KLJN key k  in vehicular communication networks depends 
on the vehicle density. For the sake of simplicity, we assume homogenous car density: 
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c
c
KLJN
N
n
N
 ,                                                  (36) 
 
where cN  is the number of cars and KLJNN  is the number of Roadside Devices with 
KLJN units. Thus, a KLJN unit serves cn  cars. Consequently, the frequency of secure 
bit donation to a single car is: 
 
sec
c
c
f
f
n
 .                                                                                                                        (37) 
 
If the length of the KLJN key is defined as kN , then by combining Eqs. (34)–(37), we 
find that the lifetime of the KLJN key in vehicular communication networks is: 
 
2k k c
k
c
N N n L
f c

  

.                                                                                                      (38) 
 
  Note that this result represents a pessimistic estimation for inhomogeneous 
vehicular communication networks when cn  is the upper limit of the number of cars any 
RSD is handling. Thus, Eq. (5) gives an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key in 
vehicular communication networks. To demonstrate the results, we assign possible 
practical values to the parameters. Let 1000L  m, 82 10c    m/s, 100   (since 
KLJN
B
B
f
  , where 
1
Bf

  should be low enough compared to KLJNB , see [40, 45]), 
 59 
 
100kN   bits, 1000cn   vehicles, and 0.1  (in order to satisfy KLJNB ≪
c
L
, that is the 
“no-wave limit” condition [22]). Then the lifetime of KLJN key is 310k   s. 
  Techniques such as building parallel channels by using chip and multi-wire 
cables can be used to enhance the speed of the KLJN scheme and to decrease k  [30]. 
There is also a possibility to increase the security of physically exchanged keys in the 
case of repeated usage [43]. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This section summarizes the main points presented in this dissertation and the 
results and contributions of this research. Also, since the KLJN key exchange scheme 
system possesses a wide range of possible applications and consequently new lines of 
work, a section on future research is also presented. 
 
4.1 Summary of the Work 
 
 In this dissertation, the types of errors that occur in the voltage-based and 
current-based measurement modes of the KLJN key exchange scheme have been 
classified and analyzed. We also presented an important practical application of the 
KLJN system. 
 Section 1 presented an introduction to our work, describing the working principle 
and the main features of the KLJN key exchange scheme, which represents our focus of 
study. This section set the tone of this dissertation by describing how it is organized and 
by presenting the main objectives of our study. 
 In section 2, the different types of errors in both the voltage-based and the 
current-based measurement modes of the KLJN secure key exchange scheme were 
classified. The mathematical approach to estimate the error probability was presented. 
Close-form expressions for the probability of each type of error in both the voltage-
based and current-based measurement modes were given. These error probabilities 
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showed an exponential dependence on the duration of the bit sharing period. 
Furthermore, an error mitigation method was developed. In this method, only the bits 
that are indicated to be secure by both the voltage-based and the current-based methods 
are kept. The resulting error probability of this combined error removal strategy is the 
product of the error probabilities of the two methods, which follows from the statistical 
independence of the AC components of the current and voltage mean-square 
measurements. This error removal method showed superior fidelity, with drastically 
reduced error probability compared to the former schemes. 
 Section 3 introduced a new practical application of the KLJN system. This 
section starts with a summary of some of the existing key exchange techniques proposed 
for vehicular communication networks. Then, special attention was given to some 
concerns regarding the level of security provided by these security techniques. 
Motivated by these concerns, we outlined how the KLJN key exchange system could 
theoretically be used to achieve unconditionally secure keys to secure the 
communication in these networks. The network model with unconditionally secure key 
exchange was presented. Based on this architecture, a new network node and new wire 
connections were described as well as the recommended communication technologies. 
Also, some technical considerations related to these new unconditionally secure keys 
such as the KLJN key generation process, the KLJN key donation to vehicles, and the 
KLJN key lifetime, were addressed.  
 
 
 62 
 
4.2 Summary of the Contributions  
 
The contributions of the work presented in this dissertation can be summarized as 
follows: 
 This work provides a mathematical formulation of the errors in the KLJN secure 
key exchange scheme. A closed-form estimate of the probability of each type of 
error in both the voltage and current measurement modes was derived for the first 
time. These formulas are simple enough to be used as design tools for the KLJN 
systems. They capture the influence of the threshold values and the duration of 
the bit sharing period on errors. 
 With the development of the combined voltage-current error mitigation strategy, 
it has been demonstrated that the KLJN system can operate without utilizing any 
error correction algorithm. This is a great advantage since adding error correction 
techniques cause information leak. Also, error correction algorithms might 
increase the data transmission overhead due to redundancy bits. It would also 
increase the complexity of the system due to encoding/decoding algorithm 
needed for error correction, which would affect the time needed for establishing 
the secure key.  
 The KLJN key exchange scheme was proposed for enhancing the security in 
vehicle communication networks. The main advantage of this network model 
with unconditionally secure key exchange is that no computational limitations 
are assumed about the eavesdropper.  
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4.3 Future Research 
 
After culminating this work, several future research lines related to the two main 
topics discussed in this dissertation have been identified. Some of them are summarized 
as follows: 
 An experimental demonstration of the KLJN key exchange scheme was already 
carried out in [31]. Unfortunately, neither the values of the thresholds nor the bit 
exchange period was varied in this experimental paper, thus making systematic 
comparison with our results impossible. Thus such experiments would be 
interesting. 
 Enhanced security protocols were proposed in [39]. These new versions of the 
KLJN system showed how the security of this key exchange scheme can be 
enhanced without discarding bits or without applying privacy amplification 
techniques. One of them, specifically the “Intelligent” KLJN (iKLJN) scheme, 
offers to improve the speed of the system and to enhance its security by reducing 
the bit sharing period. Therefore, a complete study regarding the effects of 
reducing this time window on the bit errors would be encouraged.  
 Studies regarding new attack types will be helpful in guiding us to further 
enhance the KLJN scheme; as well it would teach us the needs of new types of 
countermeasures and defense strategies. 
 The development of a protocol for distributing, managing, and storing the KLJN 
keys in the proposed unconditional secure vehicular communication model is one 
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of the most important subjects to take into consideration in the future. This 
protocol should comprise a detailed explanation on how keys are distributed and 
stored. It must also consider the key replacement protocol. Furthermore, a 
protocol used for message authentication and key verification should be 
developed. 
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APPENDIX
*
 
 
Published Paper 1: Errors and their Mitigation at the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise 
(KLJN) Secure Key Exchange 
 
This paper [40] classifies and analyzes the types of errors of bit exchange 
between Alice and Bob in the voltage-based measurement mode of the Kirchhoff-law-
Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange. Some types of errors are automatically 
removed by the original protocol. A mathematical analysis of the error probabilities and 
their dependence on the KLJN parameters of the errors that are not removed by the 
protocol is presented. Important parameters are identified, such as the duration of the bit 
sharing period 𝜏 and the parameters 𝛽 and 𝛿 that define the threshold values for bit 
interpretation. The results showed that the error probability decays exponentially by 
increasing these parameters. The most important of such parameters is the duration of 
the bit sharing period 𝜏, because its value is not limited. The results indicate that it is 
                                                 
*
Part of this section is a modified reprinted version of: Y. Saez and L. B. Kish, Errors and their mitigation 
at the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise secure key exchange, PLoS ONE 8 (2013) e81103 (7 pages), © 2013 
Saez and Kish. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: Journal of. 
Computational Electronics, Current and voltage based bit errors and their combined mitigation for the 
Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise secure key exchange, 13, 2014, 271–277, Y. Saez, L. B. Kish, R. Mingesz, 
Z. Gingl, and C. G. Granqvist, © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from: Y. Saez, X. Cao, L. B. Kish, and G. Pesti, 
Securing Vehicle Communication Systems by the KLJN key exchange protocol, Fluctuation and Noise 
Letters. 13 (2014) 1450020 (14 pages), © World Scientific Publishing Company 2014. DOI: 
10.1142/S0219477514500205. 
*
Part of this section is reprinted with kind permission from: X. Cao, Y. Saez, G. Pesti, and L. B. Kish, On 
KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks, Fluctuation and Noise Letters. 
14 (2015) 1550008 (11 pages), © World Scientific Publishing Company 2015. DOI: 
10.1142/S021947751550008X. 
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reasonable to achieve error probabilities that are small enough to avoid the need for error 
correction algorithms. 
Further open questions are how to combine current and voltage measurements to 
further reduce these errors and what is the error situation in the new advanced KLJN 
protocols proposed recently [39]. 
 
Published Paper 2: Current and Voltage-based Bit Errors and their Combined 
Mitigation for the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise Secure Key Exchange 
 
This paper [44] classifies and evaluates the types of errors that occur in the 
current-based scheme of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange. 
These error probabilities showed an exponential dependence on the duration of the bit 
exchange, which is analogous to the result for the corresponding voltage-based scheme 
as discussed in an earlier work [40]. 
 Furthermore, we presented an error mitigation strategy based on the combination 
of voltage-based and current-based schemes: only those exchanged bits are kept that are 
indicated to be secure by both the current and voltage methods. The resulting error 
probability of this combined strategy is the product of the error probabilities of the two 
methods, which follows from the statistical independence of the current and voltage 
measurements. Thus, this combination method has superior fidelity, with drastically 
reduced error probability compared to the former schemes, and it also shows an 
exponential dependence on the duration of the bit sharing period. As a consequence, the 
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KLJN scheme can operate without error correcting algorithms, thereby preserving the 
independence of the exchanged bits of the secure key. Thus, the key bits remain 
independently and identically distributed random variables, which is an important 
advantage for secure communication [4]. 
 
Published Paper 3: Bit Errors in the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise Secure Key 
Exchange 
 
This paper [45] classifies and analyzes bit errors in the voltage and current 
measurement modes of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution 
system. In both measurement modes, the error probability decays exponentially with 
increasing duration of the bit sharing period (BSP) at fixed bandwidth. We also present 
an error mitigation strategy based on the combination of voltage-based and current-based 
schemes. The combination method has superior fidelity, with drastically reduced error 
probability compared to the former schemes, and it also shows an exponential 
dependence on the duration of the BSP. With this combination method is it shown that 
the KLJN system can operate without any error correction algorithm, which would cause 
information leak towards the eavesdropper. 
This paper is a summary of recent findings presented in [40] and [44]. 
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Published Paper 4: Securing Vehicle Communication Systems by the KLJN Key 
Exchange Protocol 
 
In this paper [54], we assessed some concerns regarding the security in vehicular 
communication networks. Based on this assessment, we outlined how the KLJN could 
theoretically be used to achieve unconditional secure keys to secure vehicular 
communication networks. The points at which the KLJN system can be used are 
presented and the new network node in charge of delivering the secure KLJN keys to the 
vehicles is introduced. The main advantage of this information theoretic secure key 
network model is that none computational limitations are placed on the eavesdropper. 
This means that, with sufficient information about the channel quality and the messages, 
it is possible to make very accurate statements about the information that is extracted by 
the eavesdropper. 
 
Published Paper 5: On KLJN-based Secure Key Distribution in Vehicular 
Communication Networks 
 
 In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a 
vehicular communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based on the 
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this paper [58], we 
address the secure KLJN key donation to vehicles. This KLJN key donation solution is 
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performed lane-by-lane by using roadside key provider equipment embedded in the 
pavement. 
A method to compute the lifetime of the KLJN key is also given. This key 
lifetime depends on the car density and gives an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN 
key for vehicular communication networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
